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This paper deals with the way in which European modernity, and the West 
more generally, are reflected upon within the heterogenous field of post- and 
decolonial theories. Post- and decolonial theorists share the conviction that European 
colonialism is a modern phenomenon - despite its clear diversion from some of the core 
(universal) principles of Western modernity. Furthermore, they hold that European 
colonialism and Western imperialism have done - and still do - serious damage: to a 
very large number of people, to culture as well as to social and political institutions 
in those areas of the world in which European colonialism and Western imperialism 
have taken and are taking action; but also to the integrity, credibility and thus the 
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perception and reputation of European and Western knowledge systems, including 
their universalism. Against this backdrop, post- and decolonial theorists decidedly 
question those representations of the European or Western tradition of thought and 
politics that only focus on their positive aspects. Nevertheless, post- and decolonial 
theorists differ greatly with regard to the way in which they frame and formulate 
their critique of this tradition, as well as to the consequences they draw from their 
respective critiques.1
In the following, I will present and discuss what I see as three different positions in 
this regard. These positions are characterized by the rejection of Western modernity, 
by the suggestion to delink from it and to embrace both non-Western cosmologies 
and theoretical projects that reflect on the power effects of European colonialism 
and Western imperialism (Walter Mignolo); by a deconstruction of core text and 
principles of the European enlightenment (Gayatri Spivak); and by attempts at a 
renewal and hence a radicalization of some of its core normative claims, particularly 
humanism (Achille Mbembe). Apart from showing that post- and decolonial theories 
differ considerably with regard to the respective ways in which they conceptualize 
Western modernity, I will argue that while Walter Mignolo’s decolonial position might 
at first sight appear as the most radical of all (and is currently perhaps the most 
popular of them), at a closer look the potentials for positive change that it entails 
and puts forward seem decidedly more limited than those of authors writing in the 
postcolonial theory tradition, namely Spivak and Mbembe - at least when looked 
upon from a Western position, or with an attention to possibilities for change in 
places like Europe. There will be three parts, one on each position, followed by a 
brief conclusion.
1. Rejection
Walter Mignolo is without a doubt one of the most prominent authors in 
the field of decolonial thought. Like others in this field, he heavily draws on the 
work of Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano, who in the 1980s began to reorient the 
theoretical tradition he was coming from, namely dependency theory, by decentering 
its former economistic focus. Quijano claims two important things. First, that global 
capitalism was started in the colonial Americas; and second, that from the beginning 
of European colonialism on these continents, class, ethnic and racial relations were 
closely entangled. Right from its beginning, European colonialism established a 
1 For general overviews of postcolonial theories, see, among numerous others, the classical reader by 
Ashcroft, Griffin and Tiffin (1995) as well as Loomba (2005); with a focus on social theory Bhambra 
(2014) and Go (2016); with a focus on politics and political theory Persram (2007), Seth (2013) 
and Kerner (2012). For an overview of the growing field of decolonial theories, see, among others, 
Moraña et al. (2008).
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naturalized difference classification system to support its power structure, or, in 
other words, to organize and rationalize the striking political inequality as well as 
the division of labor (including slavery) upon which it was based. The naturalized 
differences that this classification system produced were racial, ethnic, and national 
differences; and Quijano holds that both these differences as well as forms of power 
and social stratification they made possible, live on: both within Latin American 
countries and on the global scale (Quijano, 2007). To put a name to this constellation 
in which contemporary forms of political and social power are tainted by colonial 
modes of thought and organization, he has coined the notion of the “coloniality of 
power” (Quijano, 2000, p.171).
Walter Mignolo employs Quijano’s notion of the coloniality of power to argue 
that this coloniality is intricately linked to modernity; he holds that modernity 
cannot be understood without taking its underside of coloniality into account. For 
Mignolo, coloniality denotes “the logical structure of colonial domination underlying 
the Spanish, Dutch, British, and US control of the Atlantic economy and politics, and 
from there the control and management of almost the entire planet” (Mignolo, 2005, 
p.7). So compared to Quijano, Mignolo deliberately broadens the connotation of 
coloniality. While Quijano when reasoning about the coloniality of power is interested 
in tracing current after-effects of colonialism, particularly of the colonization of the 
Americas, Mignolo generalizes the concept to name the logic of modern imperial 
power per se:
In each of the particular imperial periods of colonialism - whether led by Spain (mainly 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) or by England (from the nineteenth 
century to World War II) or by the US (from the early twentieth century until now) - 
the same logic was maintained; only power changed hands (idem, ibidem).2
According to him – again drawing heavily on Quijano –, the coloniality of modern 
imperial power embraces five aspects or realms: the economic (the appropriation 
and privatization of land, the exploitation of labor and the control of finance); the 
2 This non-differentiation of imperial logics across time and space is contested among historians of 
colonialism and imperialism. Latin Americanist Greg Grandin, for instance, differing from Mignolo, 
claims a difference between European colonialism that attempted to create great empires on 
the one hand, and what he calls a “new” U.S. imperialism that proclaims to spread freedom and 
democracy and aspires to a broad global coalition of likeminded sovereign states (Grandin, 2007). 
But Mignolo often over-emphasizes his contentions - and perhaps it is more fruitful to read his idea 
of the logic of the coloniality of power with an attention to what it is that he wants his readers 
to see and to acknowledge, namely this usually overlooked logic, than with an attention to the 
empirical contestability of some of its elements. In any case it is noteworthy that in his most recent 
book, Mignolo stresses - in an almost formulaic manner - the “constitution, transformation, and 
management of CMP,” CMP standing for the colonial matrix of power (Mignolo and Walsh, 2018, p. 
151, emphasis IK). But again, these transformations for the most part seem like adaptations of the 
same logic to changing times. “Coloniality of knowledge remained in place,” he writes, “although 
transformed in their content and regulation” (idem, 124). An example is the shift from theological 
thought in the renaissance to secular thought in the enlightenment (idem, 177).
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political, or the control of authority, which refers to the realms of both the state and 
the military; the civic, or, to be more precise, the spread of Christian family values 
with their particular notions of norms of gender and sexuality); the epistemic and 
subjective, or the control of knowledge and subjectivity, which regarding content 
includes both Christian and modern rational thought, and structurally means the 
devaluation of non-Western cosmologies and epistemologies; as well as the control 
of nature and of natural resources (Mignolo, 2005, p. 11; Mignolo, 2012, p. 143). 
Given this list, the coloniality of power appears as a highly extensive logic.
Mignolo holds that such coloniality should be seen as “the untold and 
unrecognized historical counterpart of modernity” which can neither be disconnected 
from it nor undone otherwise, at least as long as Western modernity exists (Mignolo, 
2005, p. xi). Against this backdrop, he speaks of modernity/coloniality instead of 
modernity, and considers all attempts at “repairing” modernity, for instance of 
finishing, or completing it in order to include all those who at some point in history, 
despite modernity’s universalistic claims, have been excluded from it, as an inevitably 
futile endeavor that in fact could not but “keep on producing coloniality” (idem, 
pp. xi,xv). Mignolo contests the assumption that modernity’s inherent problems 
were problems of unequal inclusion into a framework that in principal could be 
assessed as both good and all-encompassing, and thus of an inadequate actualization 
of modernity’s universalistic claims. And he seems to have two reasons for this. The 
first reason is the systemic inequality across all social fields that Western colonialism 
has produced - instead of merely not challenged and attempted to undo - from 
modernity’s beginning. The second reason is his taking issue with the universal 
pretensions of Western modern knowledge and normativity claims, pretensions that 
to him necessarily imply the de-valuation of non-modern, or rather non-Western 
epistemologies and moralities. To Mignolo, Western universality necessarily implies a 
claim to uniformity and hence an anti-plural stance. I will come back to this below.
Border thinking
As the primary source of critique against modernity/coloniality, Mignolo 
suggests what, borrowing from Chicana feminist Gloria Anzaldúa (Anzaldúa, 1987), 
he refers to as “border thinking”. To him, border thinking is a form of knowledge 
that critically reflects on what he calls the colonial wound, the damaging effects of 
colonialism and colonial modernity. This type of critical thinking necessarily entails 
two things: first, both subaltern and non-Western/indigenous epistemologies; and 
second, interculturality in the sense of epistemic plurality, which is supposed to 
counteract the encompassing and hence - to Mignolo - inevitably totalizing logics of 
modern thought. Border thinking for him is in this sense also the starting point for 
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a disruption of discursive forms of coloniality or Western modernity by imagining a 
different, pluralized world - a world of pluriversality instead of universality (Mignolo, 
2011a, p.71). Mignolo’s prime example for the setting into work of interculturality 
are projects of bilingual education, for instance the Universidad Intercultural de las 
Nacionalidades y Pueblos Indígenas Amawtay Wasi, an institution of higher education 
in Ecuador that is closely linked to indigenous movements and in its teaching combines 
Spanish and Quechua knowledge systems (Mignolo, 2005, pp.117-128); as well as 
the thought of the Mexican Zapatistas that links Marxist categories to indigenous 
cosmology (Mignolo 2000, p.140). To the Zapatistas’ Subcomandante Marcos, Mignolo 
also attributes acts and a stance of “double translation.” Marcos to him is a double 
translator in the sense that on the one hand, he has translated local discourses 
from Chiapas to the Mexican nation and the global arena; and on the other hand 
he has translated Marxism to the local population, in a way that Marxist thought 
could be “infected by Indigenous cosmology” (Mignolo 2011a, p.219). According to 
Mignolo, Marcos has thereby “displaced the model implanted by missionaries at the 
beginning of the colonial world” (idem, ibidem). For him, the Zapatistas put an act 
of “conceptual delinking from a master frame of reference situated in Western ways 
of thinking” into practice (idem, 215).
Delinking
The idea of delinking is at the center of much of Mignolo’s more recent texts on 
Western modernity. Its range of meaning encompasses different aspects and spheres. 
First of all, it means “epistemic disobedience”, not accepting the available options, 
like when the non-alignment movement of the 1950s chose to delink from the major 
Western macro-narratives, namely capitalism and communism (Mignolo, 2011b, p. 1). 
In a more subject-related sense delinking furthermore means decolonization as the 
opposite of assimilation. Mignolo speaks of acts of undoing the coloniality of one’s 
being, sensing and knowing, and hence one’s colonial subjectivation in this regard - 
and qualifies this type of work on the self as the first step towards pluriversal instead 
of universal and thus (to him) necessarily uniform horizons (Mignolo, 2012, p. 189).
As far as content is concerned, to Mignolo, delinking means a turn towards the 
communal, for instance in the form of the Caracoles, the local organizational units 
of the Zapatistas (Mignolo, 2011a, pp. 320, 324-328). Furthermore, he associates 
delinking with practices and conceptions of economy, politics, ethics, philosophy, 
technology and society that are not motivated by progress and economic growth, but 
rather by human well-being (Mignolo, 2012, p. 81). According to Mignolo, delinking 
leaves modernity/coloniality behind in so far as it parts with its predominant 
features, namely what he calls an “egological” epistemology and politics, to which 
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he attributes universal pretentions (idem, p. 81). He holds that in practice such 
egological epistemology and politics translate into neoliberalism, as well as - in the 
words of Vandana Shiva whom he quotes at this point - into a “monoculture of the 
mind,” a monoculture of thinking (idem, p. 67). The effect of this monoculture is 
a suppression and displacement of other, particularly of non-individualist and of 
non-rationalist forms of sensing and thinking. And it is precisely such subjugated 
epistemologies that delinking attempts to make space for (idem, p.170). The aim 
of this space-making gesture is not to replace Western universalism with any kind 
of non-Western epistemology or doctrine. Rather, the aim is to foster epistemic 
plurality. And in this sense, delinking for Mignolo does not mean to position oneself 
simply outside of capitalism and Western civilization. Rather, it means embracing 
“exteriority”, the position of “the outside created in the process of creating the 
inside” (Mignolo, 2011b, p.6), which can be understood as the position of those 
who have been excluded, made superfluous, rendered as the other in processes of 
Western self-formation.
In his 2011 book The Darker Side of Western Modernity Mignolo presents 
delinking as the “decolonial option” (Mignolo, 2011a). This is his preferred future 
trajectory out of a list of five such trajectories; next to the decolonial option these are 
“rewesternization”, for instance in the foreign politics of the Obama administration 
that attempted at rebuilding global confidence in the U.S, “reorientations of the Left”, 
ranging from the World Social Forum and Chavismo all the way up to organizations like 
Hamas and Hezbollah, “dewesternization” or Asian self-affirmations against Western 
thought, particularly in current India and China, and the “spiritual option” that seeks 
to find ways beyond consumer capitalism and development, like in the case of Native 
American conceptions of land as spiritual rather than as a commodity, and of buen 
vivir, the good life, as different from development (idem, p. 35-63). In short, the 
decolonial option means epistemic disobedience, acts of delinking from modernity/
coloniality and the colonial matrix of power in favor of embracing alternative routes 
which, both individually as well as taken together, establish a “pluriversal world, a 
world in which truth and objectivity in parenthesis is sovereign” (idem, p. 52). 
Pluriversality 
Mignolo is highly critical of what he calls “objectivity without parentheses” 
(Mignolo, 2011a, p.90), which he holds to result in what we might want to call 
populism or totalitarianism on the one hand, and exploitative forms of capitalism 
on the other hand; in his own words, “a closed political system ready to be taken by 
totalitarian regimes and fertile for an economy in which increases of production and 
wealth take priority over human lives and life in general” (idem, p. 70). Nevertheless, 
Interrogating Western Modernity: Postcolonial Reflections on Occidental Claims...
 Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã | jul.-dez.2018 41
it remains unclear what exactly he refers to when he speaks of “objectivity without 
parenthesis” and of what seems to be its synonym, universality - for instance when 
he notes that the “desirable hegemony is the hegemony of truth in parenthesis that 
defines the horizon of pluriversality as a universal project” (idem, p. 44). Mignolo 
clearly states that pluriversality was different from cultural relativism (Mignolo, 
2012, p. 199). Nevertheless, the hegemony of truth in parenthesis he envisions 
seems to be a pluralism of independent epistemic communities that refrain from 
imposing their perception of truth on others; and these communities seem to be 
more or less self-reliant units that are based on a shared, and hence internally non-
controversial, world-view, instead of highly interlinked, fluid entities with multiple 
forms of exchange and dialogue. So it remains unclear in which way pluriversality 
cannot not lead to cultural relativism. 
Western epistemology, by contrast, in Mignolo appears as a homogenous black 
box, a box in which everything works according to the same logic of rationality and 
universalism. To me, this conception seems questionable - for two reasons. First, 
it neither acknowledges those currents within Western thought that conceptualize 
modernity as dialectic or ambivalent - like for instance first generation Frankfurt 
School critical theory or poststructuralism - nor those currents within Western thought 
that precisely criticize any favoring of individualism and individualist rationalism; 
examples for the latter range from feminist care ethics (e.g. Gilligan, 1982; Larrabee, 
1993) via positions in the field of post-humanism (e.g. Braidotti, 2013; Haraway, 
2016) to the convivialist manifesto (Les Convivialistes, 2014).3 
Second, I hold that several serious problems of Western modernity’s history 
and present, like colonial racism or different kinds of gender hierarchies, while they 
probably should be described as being linked to colonial modernity, are not effects 
of normative universalism as a concept, but rather of the construction of those 
naturalized differences that Quijano talks about, and therefore of the reduction of 
universal justice claims to a lucky few, namely white European heterosexual males, 
and the exclusion from these claims of all others. Mignolo is neither interested in 
teasing out the potential gaps between normative universalism and Western epistemic 
imperialism (with necessarily totalizing effects), nor in the rift between Western 
modern universalism and Western modern difference claims.4 Rather, he contents 
himself with qualifying all of these strands of thought as aspects of the colonial 
3 It must be noted that in his latest book, Mignolo does briefly refer to Rosi Braidotti’s book on the 
posthuman. But he jumps to opposing her position to the work of decolonial critiques of Western 
notions of the human, and to qualify her take on the posthuman as “a Eurocentric critique of 
European humanism” (Mignolo and Walsh, 2018, pp. 171). He does so regardless of the fact that in 
her book that he refers to, Braidotti affirms the postcolonial and ecofeminist critique of humanism 
by authors like Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, Paul Gilroy and Vandana Shiva (Braidotti, 2013, pp. 45-
50) - authors whom Mignolo usually reclaims for his own theoretical position, as well.
4 For a more detailed critique of this disinterest, see Kerner (2017).
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matrix of power.
 
2. Deconstruction
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak interrogates Western modernity in a decidedly 
different way than Mignolo. Like him, she is far from reducing Western modernity 
to its noble ideas and ideals. Unlike him, however, she neither treats it as a black 
box nor fully rejects it. Rather, she engages in complex deconstructive readings of 
Occidental claims, texts and action. While Mignolo rejects modernity/coloniality, 
which he holds to be a fixed package, Spivak considers enlightenment thought as 
valuable, and any wholesale rejection of it as dangerous. Accordingly, she assesses 
the globalization of European enlightenment thought through European colonialism 
as both an enablement and a violation, and claims a double-edged attitude to it 
(Spivak, 2008, p. 263f., FN 2). In her book A Critique of Postcolonial Reason she has 
coined the expression “enabling violation” to have a name for the ambivalence that 
is prevalent here (Spivak, 1999, p. 371); but it is important to note that to her, this 
ambivalence can never serve as an excuse, or even ennoble, the violating component 
of the colonial globalization of European enlightenment thought. As an explanation 
she offers the image of “a rape that produces a healthy child, whose existence 
cannot be advanced as a justification for the rape” (idem, ibidem). “Imperialism 
cannot be justified by the fact that India has railways and I speak English well”, she 
adds (idem, ibidem). But this does not render any aspect that imperialism globalized 
either useless or problematic. On the contrary: “the enablement must be used even 
as the violation is re-negotiated” (Spivak, 2008, p. 15), Spivak claims.
Deconstruction as method
 Spivak has become famous in the realm of U.S. humanities as the translator 
of Jacques Derrida’s book Of Grammatology. Accordingly, to her, a “deconstructive 
politics of reading” would refrain from any rejection of the great enlightenment 
authors like Kant, Hegel or Marx as “motivated imperialists” - not the least because 
she holds “our sense of critique” to be “too thoroughly determined” by those authors 
(Spivak, 1999, p. 6f.). Instead, deconstruction would attempt to put their thought 
to use, or, in her own words, it would “acknowledge the determination as well as 
the imperialism and see if the magisterial texts can now be our servants” (idem, 
p. 7). Against this backdrop, Spivak’s plea for using the enablement that European 
enlightenment comes with is a deconstructive move par excellence. 
 But to her, deconstruction entails even more. It also implies “displacing rather 
than only reversing oppositions (such as between colonizer and colonized) by taking 
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the investigator’s own complicity into account” (idem, p. 244) - which does not only 
mean a move beyond colonial difference lines, but also a self-reflexive stance. Three 
aspects seem important in this regard. 
 First, a self-reflexive and hence self-critical mode which necessarily also 
includes the critic and her critique itself. Second, a stance of providing constant 
critical accompaniment to something one has not founded nor aspires to found, but 
rather finds oneself confronted with, something one may assess as problematic, yet 
that “one cannot not want” (Spivak, 1996, p. 28). The third aspect, finally, is the 
production of readings and interpretations that complicate common assessments of 
things, and hence also of Occidental claims and action, and that shift their (historical) 
complexities into focus.
 Regarding the first item on this list, the self-reflexive mode, Spivak elaborates 
on various aspects. First of all, she problematizes the romanticizing of precolonial 
conditions and cultures. Furthermore, she is highly critical of romanticizing 
the subaltern, their knowledge and their readiness for political resistance in the 
present, and holds that such representations of the subaltern often serve to render 
romanticizing authors’ own political aspirations, as well as their authorship in the 
act of representation, transparent - a concern that she has written about in greater 
detail in her essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” with regard to Michel Foucault and 
Gilles Deleuze (Spivak, 1988). Another, less romanticizing non-reflexive example of 
representation she discusses critically is Edward Thompson’s 1920s book Suttee: A 
Historical and Philosophical Enquiry into the Hindu Rite of Widow-Burning, that 
according to her, due to its methodological Eurocentrism, evokes the problematic 
figuration of “‘the third-world woman’ caught between tradition and modernization, 
culturalism and development” (Spivak, 1999, p.304), a figuration that occludes 
actual Indian women. “Nowhere in his book, written by someone who avowedly 
‘loved India,’ is there any questioning of the ‘beneficial ruthlessness’ of the British in 
India as motivated by territorial expansionism or management of industrial capital” 
(idem, p. 303), she writes. To her, the problem of this book is therefore a problem of 
representation: “The construction of a continuous and homogenous ‘India’ in terms 
of heads of state and British administrators, from the perspective of a ‘man of good 
sense’ who would be the transparent voice of reasonable humanity” (idem, ibidem). 
So here, too, the investigator’s complicity is concealed.
 But Spivak, who is keen on displacing (rather than simply reversing) oppositions, 
does not extend her critique with regard to sati to the British in India alone. She is 
similarly critical with regard to male local elites, some of whom collaborated with 
the British in codifying Hindu law (and hence also the once decidedly more complex 
regulations with regard to sati), and others of whom romanticized this practice. 
According to Spivak, instead of misrepresenting sati as a widespread misogynist 
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tradition, as the British did, local elites misrepresented it as an expression of the 
free will of true Indian women: “The ambiguity of the position of the indigenous 
colonial elite is disclosed in the nationalistic romanticization of the purity, strength, 
and love of these self-sacrificing women” (Spivak, 1999, p.296), she writes. 
 It seems to be both her deconstructivism and her feminism that make Spivak 
go beyond colonial oppositions - in favor of assessing colonial and postcolonial 
constellations in a more nuanced way, in fact in a way that attempts at shifting 
(historical) complexities into focus, particularly where they have been occluded.5 
With regard to how history is narrated, this implies an interest in, and an attention 
to, the ruptures colonialism has produced, as well as the legacy of these ruptures 
after independence. “One of the most fascinating aspects of postcoloniality in a 
former colony is the palimpsest of precolonial and postcolonial continuity raptured 
by the imperfect imposition of the Enlightenment episteme, itself travestied in the 
metropolitan social formations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries”, Spivak 
writes (Spivak, 1999, p. 239f.). To illustrate how this should be understood she refers 
to the hill district of Sirmur in Northern India, now part of India’s parliamentary 
democracy, which under British rule was recognized as a princely state. According 
to Spivak, the royal house of Sirmur “had come to feel its ‘royal’-ness rather more 
strongly under colonial influence, writing its accoutrements on a European model, 
or even perhaps a European conception of a ‘native’ king” (idem, p. 240). So in this 
example, colonialism did not at all mean a doing away with feudal traditions - it 
rather reinforced these traditions. The enlightenment that Europe exported was at 
best an imperfect one.
Human rights in practice
In 2004, Spivak published an essay on the question of human rights called 
“Righting Wrongs”. This essay is another illustration of Spivak’s double-edged critical 
attitude to Western modernity; furthermore, it is an example of what she means 
when she suggests using the enablements of European enlightenment.
To set out, Spivak clarifies that she is not at all interested in problematizing 
human rights as inherently Eurocentric, as other critics might do; rather, she thinks 
of how their potentials may be put to use for the task of “the righting of wrongs” 
(Spivak, 2008, p. 15). According to her, this practice indeed blurs the European origins 
5 Spivak’s critique of colonial oppositions also includes race thinking, or “chromatism”, as she calls it 
(Spivak, 1999, p. 164). To her, any reproduction of such thinking, including in the realm of anti-racist 
feminism relying on the category of “women of color”, is highly problematic - since it “belongs to 
the repertory of colonialist axiomatics” and furthermore “is based on the implicit acceptance of 
‘white’ as ‘transparent’ or ‘no-color,’ and is therefore reactive upon the self-representation of the 
white” (idem, pp. 167, 165). 
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of human rights, or rather renders them politically irrelevant: “in the Global South, 
the domestic human rights workers are, by and large, the descendants of the colonial 
subjects, often culturally positioned against Eurocentrism” (idem, p. 16), she writes. 
So we can say that for Spivak, the practice of righting wrongs is what matters most 
with regard to human rights; that human rights interest her less as a legal text, but 
rather as a political instrument to be used from below; and that the human rights 
text in fact becomes valuable precisely when it is used from below, and in this sense 
accompanied by activism. 
Spivak’s concrete suggestion with regard to the critical accompaniment of the 
legal text of human rights by political action from below is to engage in educative 
work, in a particular kind of pedagogy. The basic aim of such work is an empowerment 
of the subalterns (particularly the rural poor in the Global South), an empowerment 
that makes it possible for them to learn about their entitlements, and that enables 
them to perceive themselves as subjects of human rights in the first place. The 
educational efforts that Spivak envisions and explains in her essay (after for several 
years she undertook them herself) basically consist in teacher’s trainings in the poor 
parts of the Indian countryside - trainings which on a very practical level work against 
the predominant pedagogy that merely consists in making students memorize instead 
of comprehend any content, and which furthermore foster students’ democratic 
reflexes of questioning authorities. Spivak hopes that in the long run, this may 
foster the activation of democratic structures; structures in which human dignity is 
understood in the sense of an enjoyment of rights (Spivak, 2008, p. 49ff.). “[I]t is in 
view of Marx’ hope to transform the subaltern […] into an agent of the undoing of 
class apartheid rather than its victim that this effort at educating the educator is 
undertaken” (idem, p. 28), Spivak claims. Class apartheid in education to her is the 
difference between rote and comprehension - rote learning for the poor, education 
fostering comprehension for the middle and upper classes (idem, p. 53f.). Spivak 
characterizes the Indian public sector education system as “a corrupt ruin of the 
colonial model” (idem, p. 56). An education that “teaches the habit of democratic 
civility” and enables students to perceive themselves as subjects of universal human 
rights and to act accordingly (idem, ibidem), is hence an act of using select aspects 
of the European enlightenment tradition against legacies of European colonialism. It 
is the use of the enablement to undo the long-term effects of the violation.
3. Renewal
To briefly repeat: Mignolo rejects Western modernity as always already colonial 
and suggests acts of delinking in favor of what he calls the decolonial option, namely 
critical border thinking and ways of thought and life that draw on knowledge that has 
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been subjugated and exteriorized by European colonialism and Western modernity. 
Spivak, by contrast, engages in critical reflections of modern texts, ideas and action 
in order to deconstruct them, to shed light on their contradictions and ambivalences, 
their instrumentalization, their unfulfilled promises, their silences and their power 
effects - but also on their potentials as tools towards more justice. She does so 
precisely because she assumes that we cannot want to do without these texts and 
ideas. But she also holds that we should not only try to stay clear from reproducing 
their problems, but to furthermore undergo the extra effort that is needed for the 
task of actually putting them to emancipatory use. And the “we” in this sentence 
refers to everyone, but maybe particularly to those of us who do not find themselves 
in a subaltern position, yet aim towards a better, a less unjust world for all.
Achille Mbembe chooses a third path, a path that partly coincides with the one 
pursued by Spivak, and partly leads further, or at least in a slightly different direction: 
the path of renewing select concepts, norms and ideas that the Western legacy 
provides us with. Since his work focuses to a great extent on the history, mechanisms 
and legacy of colonial racism with its long tradition of de-humanizing black Africans 
as well as their descendants, it is not coincidental that the concept that he aspires 
to renew is the one of humanism. Mbembe develops his ideas regarding this renewal 
with reference to the work of Frantz Fanon - particularly to Fanon’s plea for a new, 
critical humanism and to his conviction that a better world requires the destruction 
of colonial divisions and patterns of compartmentalization (Fanon, 2004). What 
against this backdrop Mbembe calls for is the formation of ethical communities that 
transcend colonial lines of differentiation, and thereby have the potential to finally 
undo them.6
The legacy of colonial racism
In several of his writings, Mbembe reaches this suggestion after walking his 
readers through detailed, and often painful, accounts of colonial racism and its 
afterlife. Already in his seminal work On the Postcolony (Mbembe, 2001) he focuses 
on the epistemic, or discursive dimension of colonial practices and their effects 
in colonies and postcolonies - primarily those racist difference constructions that 
European colonial powers used to render Africa as Europe’s Other and that negated 
its peoples the status of full humanity. Mbembe characterizes such difference 
constructions as a form of power inherently connected to violence. Part of this 
refers to their content: according to him, the reduction to physicality, ascriptions 
of irrationality and the animalization and bestialization that characterized colonial 
6 For a discussion of the differences between Mbembe’s and Mignolo’s interpretations of Fanon, see 
Kerner (2014); for further interpretations of Fanon’s humanism see Gilroy (2011) and Go (2012).
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imaginations of the African population had brutalizing effects (idem, p. 14). 
Furthermore, such images of Africans did not only circulate in the sphere of the 
cultural, but were institutionalized in the course of the slave trade and colonialism; 
they were materialized in various ways. According to Mbembe, this made violence 
infuse economy, the private, language and consciousness; it became a cultural 
practice and constituted a spirit of violence with far reaching subjectivation effects 
(idem, p. 175). In his more recent book Critique of Black Reason (Mbembe, 2017), 
Mbembe focuses on the brutality and the dehumanizing effects of colonial racism 
once more - this time broadening his geographical focus to include Europe and 
North America in terms of such effects. He does not only give a detailed account 
of European race thinking as well as of its re-actualizations in fields as diverse as 
genomics, reproductive technologies, and the spheres of digitization, securitization 
and surveillance; also capital, he claims, “still leverages racial subsidies in its pursuit 
of profit”, particularly in its ongoing acts of primitive accumulation (idem, p. 23). 
Even more so than for the present, it is for modern European history as well as for 
world history that Mbembe claims intricate links between colonialism and capitalism 
- with the plantation in the Americas, based on black slave labor, as its most strident 
manifestation. Furthermore, he stresses that colonial political practice was based on 
a coupling of habitualized race logics, the logic of profit, a politics of violence and an 
instinct for corruption (idem, p. 62). It is important to note that according to Mbembe, 
the maintenance of this constellation required a pedagogy of habituation to racism 
in the metropoles; such a pedagogy was “founded essentially on the principle that 
the relationship to Blacks must be a relationship of nonreciprocity” (idem, p. 63). 
Accordingly, to Mbembe, the legacy of European modernity can only be understood 
in correlation to European race history: “the coming of modernity coincided with 
the appearance of the principle of race and the latter’s slow transformation into the 
privileged matrix for techniques of domination, yesterday as today” (idem, p. 55), 
he stresses. And it almost goes without saying that to him, a meaningful critique of 
European modernity must therefore necessarily be a critique of all forms of European 
racism, as well.
The idea of a common human nature
It is precisely against this backdrop of the pervasiveness of colonial racism in 
the history of our global present that Mbembe suggests the strengthening of the idea 
of a common human nature, an idea that for a long time posed - and maybe still poses 
- “a problem for Western consciousness” (Mbembe, 2001, p. 2). It is important to note 
that the strengthening of the idea of a common human nature, as Mbembe suggests 
it, implies both sides of the former colonial split. With regard to the colonized, 
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Mbembe argues that Fanon’s revolutionary theory should be interpreted within the 
context of a more general theory of the rise in humanity, when he writes:
The colonized has to propel himself, by his own force, to a level above the one to 
which he has been consigned as a result of racism and subjugation. […] In this way, 
he restores the possibility, for him personally and for humanity as a whole, starting 
with his executioners, of new and open dialogue between two equal human subjects 
where, previously, there had been opposition between a man (the colonialist) and 
his object (the colonized). From then on there is no more black and white. There is 
only a world finally rid of the burden of race, a world to which everyone has a right 
(Mbembe, 2012, p. 24).
As this quote should make clear, when Mbembe speaks of a common human 
nature or the rise in humanity, he does not refer to Western humanism and 
universalism in an unbroken way. Neither does he endorse some simple form of post-
racialism, announced from above. For like Mignolo, he holds that there is a racist 
underside that the Western tradition of thought has produced in order to be able 
to restrict its assertive claims to people of European descent (Mbembe, 2009, p. 
34). Unlike Mignolo, however, Mbembe claims that it is possible to move away from 
this constellation. What to him is needed for not reproducing the effects of the 
colonial order in the present is a political culture that makes it possible for every 
person to regain subject status, to be recognized as a fellow human and to engage 
in person-to-person dialogue, also across the former difference lines. Creating the 
preconditions and hence the possibilities for such a political culture is the task that 
Mbembe assigns to former colonial states: through acts of an adequate politics of 
memory that publicly acknowledges, and takes responsibility, for the atrocities of 
European colonialism and the harm that it caused; by acts of restitution, particularly 
of human remains, the establishment of memorial sites and museums; and, even 
more important, by forms of material compensation and reparations. Such forms of 
compensation to Mbembe serve to undo some of the long-term effects of centuries 
of colonial exploitation; but they also have the symbolic effect of re-entering into 
a relation of reciprocity and mutuality (Mbembe, 2010, p. 52f.; Mbembe, 2017, p. 
182f.). Only such a culture of mutuality and the common would enable the disruption 
of violent colonial hierarchies, on the one hand, and anti-colonial counter violence 
and revenge on the other (Mbembe, 2009, p. 35).
Transgressing colonial difference lines
So while for Mignolo, who advocates acts of delinking, hopes for a better 
future are restricted to contexts that are posited outside of modern/colonial logics, 
Mbembe’s aim is to establish ethical communities precisely across former colonial 
difference lines - as difficult as this might be. In South Africa, for example, according 
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to him it demands no less than a recognition of “black people’s capacity for self-
making, self-reference and self-expression” and “versions of whiteness that are […] 
constituted […] around an ethics of mutuality and human solidarity” (idem, p. 36) - 
and hence a severe break with logics and mindsets of apartheid. 
Furthermore, I’d like to argue that while Mignolo renounces the European 
tradition, and while Spivak is interested in attempts at putting its enabling tools 
to emancipatory use, Mbembe holds that tradition, and those who claim to be its 
trustees, accountable. According to him, postcolonial thought “calls upon Europe 
to live what it declares to be its origins, its future and its promise, and to live 
all of that responsibly” (idem, p. 38). For how a good model of conviviality across 
former, colonial difference lines may look like, Mbembe refers to what he calls 
“Afropolitanism” - and hence precisely not to European examples, but to African 
ones. To him, Afropolitanism is on the one hand a form of thought that rather looks 
for transgression than for roots; on the one hand it is the lived experience of people 
in African countries, shaped by migration, dispersion and mobility, and a form of 
identity that rather embraces then expels the foreign and the strange, that in fact 
counts with the foreign and the strange as a normal condition of life (Mbembe, 2010, 
p. 221-229). That (not only) contemporary Europe has a lot to learn from such a 
stance, is without any doubt.
4. Conclusion
Mignolo, Spivak and Mbembe differ in many respects - but in some regards their 
critical accounts of Western modernity also overlap, or at least seem compatible. 
All three stress that European colonialism wasn’t in the first place a strategy-game 
of European states that competed for their place in the sun (which is what until 
today you often learn in school in Germany, for example), nor a noble civilizing 
mission - but rather a severe violation, comprising genocide, slavery, massive forms 
of dispossession and exploitation, social, political and cultural destruction, and the 
global institutionalization of racism, including the sub-categorization of humanity into 
different naturalized as well as hierarchized “races”. Mignolo, Spivak and Mbembe 
also stress that European colonialism has always been intricately linked with, has 
always been a component of, Western modernity, and that from a colonial (and, for 
that matter, post- and decolonial) perspective, this has always been quite apparent. 
I hold this to be very important - since from a Western European perspective, this link 
for a very long time has not been apparent, has in fact been systematically occluded, 
which I think should be interpreted as an effect of coloniality itself. This occlusion 
might have worked since the barbarity that was an essential part of European 
colonialism happened for the most part outside of the European mainland. But this 
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also means that modern Europe from its beginning engaged in a huge endeavor of 
exporting barbarity. Mignolo, Spivak, Mbembe and several other authors writing in 
the critical traditions of post- and decolonial theory remind us to take this export of 
barbarity seriously when we attempt at understanding both Western modernity and 
the world as we know (and often don’t know) it. And they remind us to do so because 
they have good reasons to assume that the effects of this export (and in parts, the 
export itself) are far from over.
Mignolo, Spivak and Mbembe differ with respect to the conclusions they draw 
from this diagnosis, though.7 Mignolo seems to be the most pessimistic, or skeptical, 
with regard to possibilities of repairing the modern constellation - hence his suggestion 
to delink from it, to exit, and to find resources for creating alternatives in Western 
modernities’ exteriorized communities and cosmologies, as local as these may always 
remain. Spivak, on the other hand, rather looks out for the ambivalences of Western 
modernity, and seeks to make use of the enablements it promises to everyone - 
while stressing that these enablements don’t at all come natural to everyone, but 
rather have to be claimed and fought for. But in the sense that European colonialism 
globalized these enablements, she holds them to be universal (and indispensable); 
at least in principle. Mbembe, finally, even goes a step further, when he holds Europe 
accountable for what it proclaims to stand for. If taken seriously, the implications 
of such an attempt of Europe at assuming accountability would imply tremendous 
change - within the continent itself, but also globally. Border regimes and migration 
politics would be one among many other aspects of such change.8
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